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This contribution presents an overview of  the Belgian Constitutional Court and its activi-
ties during 2016. Two constitutional controversies that were at the forefront of  political 
discussions and attracted much media attention are discussed, namely the separation of  pow-
ers and the refugee “crisis” as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between the European Union and Canada. Moreover, the article gives an overview of  
the main cases of  the Belgian Constitutional Court of  the past year that may be of  interest to 
an international audience. These cases are divided into the following categories: the Belgian 
Constitution in Europe and the world, separation of  powers, justice and order, ethical issues 
and hot topics.
1. Introduction
This contribution starts out by presenting the Belgian Constitutional Court and its 
activities in 2016. Second, two constitutional controversies are discussed that were at 
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the forefront of  political discussions and attracted much media attention, namely the 
separation of  powers and the refugee “crisis” as well as the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and Canada.1 Finally, we 
deliver an overview of  the main cases of  the Constitutional Court of  the past year 
that can be of  interest to an international audience. These cases are divided into the 
following categories: the Belgian Constitution in Europe and the world, separation of  
powers, justice and order, ethical issues, and hot topics.
2. The Constitution and the Constitutional Court
In the 1970s, Belgium embarked on a process of  federalization. The transformation 
of  the unitary Belgian state into a federal state led to a multiplication of  legislative 
bodies. The creation of  federated entities—regions and communities—empowered 
to adopt rules with the same legal effect as acts of  the federal parliament resulted in 
the possibility of  conflicts between legislative acts. Therefore, the original mission of  
the Constitutional Court was to oversee the constitutional division of  powers between 
the federal state, the communities, and the regions. In the following decades, the com-
petence of  the Court was gradually extended to the constitutional rights and freedoms.
Now that the division of  powers is well established between the federated entities 
and the federal state, conflicts of  competencies only represent a small portion of  the 
case law (4 percent of  the judgments in 2016). The majority of  cases in 2016 concern 
infringements of  the principle of  equality and non-discrimination, which, for histori-
cal reasons, is still the most invoked principle before the Court (52 percent). This is fol-
lowed by review of  compliance with the fundamental socioeconomic rights of  article 
23 of  the Constitution (11 percent), the guarantees in taxation matters of  articles 
170 and 172 (8 percent), the property rights of  article 16 (5 percent), the legality 
principle in criminal matters of  articles 12 and 14 (4 percent), and the right to private 
and family life of  article 22 (4 percent).
The Court makes the assumption that the fundamental rights under Title II of  the 
Constitution and those enshrined in international conventions are inextricably linked. 
It is, therefore, unavoidable that the provisions under Title II are interpreted in con-
junction with the provisions concerning similar fundamental rights in international 
treaties. As a result, the case law of  the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
a considerable influence on the case law of  the Constitutional Court, which considers 
itself  to be bound by the provisions of  the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)2 as interpreted by the ECtHR. Moreover, the case law of  the Court of  Justice 
of  the European Union (CJEU) is also regularly reflected in the jurisprudence of  the 
Constitutional Court.
1 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.–E.U., Sep. 26, 2014, European Comm’n, http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/.
2 European Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, in 
force Nov. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
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A case may be brought before the Constitutional Court through an action for annul-
ment or a reference for a preliminary ruling. Along with the action for annulment, or 
during the course of  the proceedings, the suspension of  the challenged legislative act 
may be demanded.
An action for annulment may be brought by the various governments, presidents of  
parliaments (at the request of  two-thirds of  their members); and any natural or legal 
person who has a justifiable interest in the annulment. In 2016, two institutional par-
ties and seventy-two individual applicants brought a case before the Court. An action 
for annulment must, as a rule, be brought within six months of  the official publication 
of  the challenged act. If  an action for annulment is well founded, the Court will annul 
all or part of  the challenged provisions (twenty-nine in 2016), while (provisionally) 
maintaining—where appropriate—the effects of  the provisions in question (three 
times). If  the action for annulment is dismissed (on nineteen occasions in 2016), the 
judgment shall be binding on the courts with respect to the points of  law settled by 
the judgment. In the other four judgments (out of  a total of  fifty-two), the annulment 
appeal was declared inadmissible.
The action for annulment does not suspend the effect of  the challenged act. In order 
to prevent the challenged norm from causing irrevocable prejudice during the period 
between the introduction of  the action and the judgment of  the Court, the Court 
may—at the applicant’s request and in exceptional circumstances—order the suspen-
sion of  the challenged norm pending a judgment on the merits of  the case. In 2016, 
suspension was ordered in three cases. Such an action for suspension must be brought 
within three months following the official publication of  the challenged norm.
If  one of  the parties invokes the infringement by a legislative act of  the division 
of  competencies between the state, the communities and the regions, by the funda-
mental rights guaranteed in Title II “The Belgians and their rights” or by the articles 
143(1), 170, 172, and 191 of  the Constitution in a dispute before a court of  law, the 
latter must in principle refer a question for a preliminary ruling to the Constitutional 
Court. In 2016, most of  the preliminary questions were referred by the Courts of  First 
Instance (fifty-one), followed by the courts of  appeal (twenty-five), the labor courts 
(ten), and the labor tribunals (ten). Incidentally, the highest courts also referred some 
questions, namely eight times for the Council of  State and on six occasions for the 
Court of  Cassation. An infringement was found in 36 percent of  these cases, whereas 
no infringement was found on sixty-four occasions (58 percent of  the cases). In other 
judgments, the Court held that the question does not need an answer, referred the 
case back to the court of  law, declared itself  incompetent or declared the question 
inadmissible.
In 2016, the Court delivered 170 judgments and handled 207 cases in total. The 
discrepancy between the number of  treated and completed cases and the number of  
judgments is due to joined cases. Moreover, proceedings are sometimes terminated by 
court order that, for example, grants the discontinuance of  the action. Conversely, it 
may happen that the Court gives an interlocutory ruling or a provisional ruling while 
the case is still pending. This takes place when the Court refers a case to the CJEU for 
a preliminary ruling.
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Six judgments ruled on a request for suspension, fifty-two judgments concerned 
actions for annulment, 110 judgments concerned references for preliminary rulings, 
and two judgments handled requests for interpretation. Therefore, most judgments 
were preliminary rulings (65 percent), while actions for annulment represented 31 
percent and requests for suspension represented 4 percent in 2016.
3. Constitutional controversies
3.1. The separation of  powers and the refugee “crisis”
Since October 2016, Belgium has witnessed a fierce debate about the separation of  pow-
ers related to the refugee “crisis.” The controversy started when a Syrian family asked 
for a humanitarian visa via the Belgian embassy in Beirut for a short stay in Belgium in 
order to be able to seek asylum. The applicants invoked article 3 ECHR which prohibits 
inhuman or degrading treatment. The Belgian Immigration Service, which falls under 
the authority of  the Secretary of  State for Asylum and Migration, Theo Francken, 
denied the request, but was faced with a suspension of  its decision by the Council for 
Alien Law Litigation (CALL)3 and with the injunction to take a new decision within 
forty-eight hours due to an insufficient reasoning regarding the risk of  inhuman or 
degrading treatment. This judgment was followed by two other suspensions by the 
CALL4 due to insufficient reasoning, as the rejection decision was three times literally 
almost identical. The third time, even though issuing a visa is a discretionary decision 
of  the competent administrative authority, the judge compelled the Secretary of  State 
to issue a visa. This judgment elicited Francken and his party New Flemish Alliance 
(N-VA) to launch an advertising campaign attacking the “unworldly judges” for their 
alleged judicial activism. He filed an appeal in cassation before the Council of  State, 
as well as appeals against the judgment of  the President of  the Francophone Brussels 
Court of  First Instance5 who imposed a coercive fine related to the obligation to issue 
the visa. Francken firmly refused to issue the visa and to pay the fine.
These actions led to severe criticism, among others by the High Council of  Justice, 
stating that the Secretary of  State refused to comply with the separation of  pow-
ers and undermined the rule of  law. In another case,6 the CALL referred for a pre-
liminary ruling to the CJEU with regard to the legal issue at stake about the request 
for a humanitarian visa via an embassy. Several other countries and the European 
Commission joined the case.7 The Advocate-General advised the CJEU to hold that 
an EU member state is obliged to issue a visa on humanitarian grounds if, given the 
3 Conseil du Contentieux des Étrangers [CCE] [Council for Alien Law Litigation], decision no. 175.973, Oct. 
7, 2016 (Belg.).
4 CCE decision no. 176.363, Oct. 14, 2016, and CCE, decision no. 176.577, Oct. 20, 2016 (Belg.).
5 Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of  First Instance], Bruxelles, decision no. 16/3438/B, Oct. 
25, 2015 (Belg.).
6 CCE, decision no. 179.108, Dec. 8, 2016 (Belg.).
7 C-638/16 PPU X and X v. État belge, Mar. 7, 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:173.
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circumstances, there are strong reasons to believe that a refusal would directly lead 
to the applicant being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, by 
withholding a legal action to exercise the right to request international protection 
in that member state. Nevertheless, the CJEU (Grand Chamber) did not explicitly 
hold that there is an obligation to issue a visa in this case, because an application 
for a visa with limited territorial validity made on humanitarian grounds by a third-
country national, on the basis of  article 25 of  the Community Code on Visas,8 to the 
representation of  the Member State of  destination situated within the territory of  a 
third country, with a view to lodging, immediately upon the arrival in that Member 
State, an application for international protection and, thereafter, to staying there 
for more than ninety days in a 180-day period, does not fall within the scope of  that 
code but, as European Union law currently stands, solely within that of  national 
law.9
3.2. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
In October 2016, the world was wondering how the Minister-President of  the Walloon 
Region, on his own motion, was able to postpone the signing of  the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada. The treaty-
making power in Belgium is allocated according to the principle of  in foro interno, in 
foro externo, established in article 167 of  the Belgian Constitution. Community and 
Region governments have the power to enter treaties that exclusively relate to matters 
falling within their jurisdiction. As regards “mixed treaties,” such as CETA, the treaty-
making power is shared with the federal authorities. After a period of  power play and 
some minor adjustments, the Walloon Government conceded, which allowed CETA to 
be signed.
4. Major Cases
4.1. The Belgian Constitution in Europe and the world
In 2016, the Constitutional Court continued to show great openness towards inter-
national and European law, in particular the ECHR and EU Law. References were 
made to the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR in forty-six cases and to the case law of  
the CJEU in nineteen cases. References to other sources of  international law can be 
found in twenty-nine cases. Based on the CILFIT case law of  the Court of  Justice10, the 
Constitutional Court ruled in five cases, ensuing a request by the parties that there 
was no need to refer for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.
8 Regulation 810/2009 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  13 July 2009 establishing a 
Community Code on Visas of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, O.J. (L 243) at 1.
9 C-638/16 PPU X and X v. État belge, Mar. 7 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:173.
10 See 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo Sp.A.  v.  Ministry of  Health, Oct. 6, 1982, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:335.
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(a) Judgment No. 62/2016: Treaty on stability; demand for annulment; 
admissibility; primacy of  EU Law; national identity
The 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact) is an intergovernmental agreement between 
twenty-five EU member states to reinforce budget discipline of  euro area governments 
following the sovereign debt crisis in 2010.11 The Constitutional Court had to decide 
on the admissibility of  a demand for annulment of  various acts of  the federal and the 
Flemish parliament approving the Fiscal Compact and implementing its article 3(1).12 
A number of  citizens and non-profit organizations asserted that the strict budgetary 
objectives established in the fiscal compact would lead to the authorities no longer 
being able to fulfill their constitutional obligations in terms of  fundamental social 
rights (Article 23 of  the Constitution).
The fact that austerity measures can be imposed on the basis of  the Fiscal Compact 
is, according to the judgment, not sufficient to demonstrate a proper individualized 
connection between the personal situation of  the applicants and the disputed provi-
sions. They could only be affected directly and unfavorably by measures intended to 
achieve those budgetary objectives. In the Court’s view, having an interest as a citizen 
or a person who has the right to vote is likewise not sufficient, because the challenged 
acts have no direct effect on the right to vote. Nonetheless, the Court considered 
whether the challenged acts interfered with any other aspect of  the democratic rule 
of  law which would be so essential that its protection is in the interest of  all citizens. 
Parliament is indeed the only constitutional body empowered to approve the annual 
budget, but also to set medium-term budgetary objectives. It can enter into such com-
mitments by way of  a treaty. When they approve a treaty, however, the legislators may 
not violate constitutional guarantees. Although the Fiscal Compact makes provision 
for detailed targets and deficit reduction, it leaves national parliaments entirely at lib-
erty as to how they draw up and approve budgets.
The Fiscal Compact does not merely create an inflexible budgetary framework, it also 
entrusts certain powers to the EU institutions, which is permitted by the Constitution 
(article 34). However, for the first time the Court asserts that
under no circumstances can there be any discriminatory violation of  the national identity 
contained in the basic political and constitutional structures or of  the fundamental values of  
protection that the Constitution affords to any person.13
The disputed acts, however, do not interfere with any aspect of  the democratic 
rule of  law, which is so essential that its protection is in the interest of  all citizens. 
Consequently, none of  the applicants had an interest to the degree required for them 
to seek the annulment of  the challenged acts and the annulment appeals were thus 
declared inadmissible.
11 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Mar. 2, 2012 
[hereinafter Fiscal Compact].
12 Cour Constitutionelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no.  62/2016, Apr. 28, 2016, available at 
http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2016/2016-062f-info.pdf  (Belg.).
13 Id. at 22.
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4.2. Separation of powers
(a) Judgment No. 153/2016: administrative courts; administrative loop; 
independence and impartiality of  the judiciary
In judgments nos. 103/2015,14 74/2014,15 and 152/2015,16 the Constitutional 
Court reviewed the constitutionality of  the so-called “administrative loops” of  the 
(federal) Council of  State and the (Flemish) Council for Permit Disputes and the High 
Enforcement Council for the Environment. An administrative loop allows an adminis-
trative judge to give an administrative authority in an interim judgment the possibility 
of  rectifying the irregularity of  a contested administrative act. This aims to contribute 
to the final adjudication of  disputes in a timely manner. According to the Court, the 
initial design of  the loop provided administrative judges with the possibility of  express-
ing their viewpoint regarding the outcome of  a dispute, even though the use of  the 
loop would not result in a (rectified) decision with an altered content. As a result, the 
Court argues that the administrative loop puts a strain on the separation of  powers, 
and in a discriminatory way violates the principle of  impartiality and independence 
of  the judiciary. According to the Court, the administrative judge intervenes in the 
determination of  the content of  a discretionary administrative act, which is a task of  
the administrative authorities.
On December 1, 2016, however, the Constitutional Court dismissed an appeal 
against the Decree of  June 3, 2015,17 which grants the above-mentioned two Flemish 
administrative courts a redesigned administrative loop for formal and substantive 
illegalities.18 The judge can now offer the defendant the possibility of  rectifying the 
unlawfulness by adopting a new rectified administrative act of  which the content 
can be altered. In contrast to the previously designed loops, the judge now only holds 
whether the unlawfulness can be rectified, but he no longer needs to rule on the con-
tent of  the administrative act. The Constitutional Court rejected all the arguments 
of  the applicant and held that the contested provision was constitutional. The Court 
ruled, inter alia, that there was no longer a violation of  the independence and impar-
tiality of  the judge.
14 CC decision no. 103/2015, July 16, 2016, available at http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2015/2015-
103f.pdf  (Belg.). See English version at http://www.const-court.be/public/e/2015/2015-103e.pdf.
15 CC decision no.  74/2014, May 8, 2014, available at http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2014/2014-
074f.pdf  (Belg.).
16 CC decision no. 152/2015, Oct. 29, 2015, available at http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2015/2015-
152f.pdf  (Belg.).
17 Decreet tot wijziging van art. 4.8.19 van de Vlaamse codex ruimtelijke ordening en het decreet van 4 
april 2014 betreffende de organisatie en de rechtspleging van sommige Vlaamse Bestuursrechtscolleges 
[Decree Amending Art. 4.8.19 of  the Flemish Code Urban Planning and the Decree of  4 April 2014 
Concerning the Organization and the Judicial Procedure of  some Flemish Administrative Courts], June 3, 
2015, Belgisch Staatsblad [B.S.] [Official Gazette of  Belgium], July 16, 2015.
18 CC decision no. 153/2016, Dec. 1, 2016, available at http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2016/2016-
153f.pdf  (Belg.).
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4.3. Justice and order
(a) Judgment No. 83/2016: Criminal Procedure Code; out of  court 
settlement; insufficient judicial review
Article 216bis(2) of  the Criminal Procedure Code, as introduced by the Act of  April 
14, 2011,19 and modified by the Acts of  July 11, 201120 and February 5, 2016,21 
considerably enlarged the possibility for public prosecutors to settle criminal cases out 
of  court. Such a settlement also became possible when the case was already pending 
before the criminal court or was already judged in first instance, as long as there was 
no final judgment on appeal, provided that the victims had been compensated prop-
erly. The Constitutional Court judged that insofar as the public prosecutor can settle 
a case that is under instruction of  an investigating judge without an effective judicial 
review of  the proposed settlement, the provision is incompatible with articles 10 and 
11 of  the Constitution in conjunction with the right to a fair trial and the principle of  
independence of  the judiciary, guaranteed by article 151 of  the Constitution, article 
6(1) ECHR and article 14(1) of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).22,23 As the settlements concerned cases pending before the criminal (trial) 
judge in first instance or appeal, the judicial review limited to the formal conditions of  
the settlement was considered to be insufficient and thus violated the same provisions 
and principles. The Court decided to uphold the legal effects of  the unconstitutional 
provision until the date of  publication of  the judgment in the official journal.
(b) Judgment No. 108/2016: police databases; privacy; supervision
The Act of  March 18, 201424 provides a comprehensive legal framework for the vari-
ous databases of  the federal and local police in Belgium. The Act identifies the vari-
ous databases, the data that they may or must contain in view of  administrative or 
judicial policing, their management, the use of  these data, the measures taken to 
19 Wet houdende diverse bepalingen [Law Containing Various Provisions], Apr. 14, 2011, B.S., May 6, 
2011.
20 Wet tot wijziging van de artikelen 216bis en 216ter van het Wetboek van strafvordering en van artikel 7 
van de wet van 6 juni 2010 tot invoering van het Sociaal Strafwetboek [Law Amending Articles 216bis 
and 216ter of  the Code of  Criminal Procedure and Article 7 of  the Law of  6 June 2010 introducing the 
Social Criminal Code], July 11, 2011, B.S., Aug. 1, 2011.
21 Wet tot wijziging van het strafrecht en de strafvordering en houdende diverse bepalingen inzake justitie 
[Law Amending Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure and Containing Various Provisions on Justice], 
Feb. 5, 2016, B.S., Feb. 16, 2016.
22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, in force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
23 CC decision no.  83/2016, June 2, 2016, available at http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2016/2016-
083f.pdf  (Belg.).
24 Wet betreffende het politionele informatiebeheer en tot wijziging van de wet van 5 augustus 1992 
op het politieambt, de wet van 8 december 1992 tot bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten 
opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens en het Wetboek van strafvordering [Law Concerning 
Police Information Management and Amending the Law of  August 5, 1992 on Police Office, the Law of  
December 8, 1992 on the Protection of  Privacy Relating to the Processing of  Personal Data and the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure], Mar. 18, 2014, B.S., Mar. 28, 2014.
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protect privacy and abuse, the access and supervision, and the interaction with the 
judiciary and other law enforcement bodies. In a lengthy judgment of  141 pages the 
Court comes to the conclusion that, considered as a whole, sufficient measures have 
been taken to avoid any non-justified interference in the right to privacy guaran-
teed by article 22 of  the Constitution, article 8 ECHR, article 17 ICCPR, and articles 
7 and 8 of  the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights,25 after a detailed analysis of  the 
relevant ECtHR case law. Nonetheless, the Court imposed a restrictive interpretation 
of  several provisions.26 Only one provision was partially annulled, namely concern-
ing the composition of  the body supervising the observance of  the law by the vari-
ous police departments. As the number of  police members can exceed the number of  
external independent experts and members of  the judiciary or members representing 
the Privacy Commission, the Court is of  the opinion that the Act does not offer suffi-
cient guaranties for effective and independent supervision. The legislator is ordered to 
amend this provision before the end of  2017.
4.4. Ethical issues and hot topics
(a) Judgment No. 2/2016: freedom of  choice regarding a child’s surname; 
equality between men and women
In 2014, the federal legislature amended the Civil Code27 in order to establish auton-
omy of  choice and equality between men and women regarding the way in which 
surnames are passed on to children. The new provision enabled parents to choose 
between the father’s surname, the mother’s surname, or a double-barreled surname 
made up of  these two surnames in the order determined by them. It also stated that 
if  the parents disagreed on the choice of  the child’s surname or if  they do not make a 
choice, the father’s surname would be assigned to the child. The latter provision was 
challenged before the Constitutional Court.28
The Court first held that the right to pass on one’s surname cannot be regarded as 
a fundamental right. It noted the legislature’s choice to give preference to the parents’ 
freedom of  choice and considered it justified for parliament to determine the surname 
in cases of  disagreement or lack of  choice, as it is important to establish a child’s sur-
name at birth in a simple, swift, and uniform way. However, the reasons for giving pre-
cedence to the father’s surname in these cases—tradition and a desire to make gradual 
progress—do not justify the differential treatment between the parents, solely on the 
25 Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/02 [hereinafter Charter of  
Rights].
26 CC decision no. 108/2016, July 14, 2016, available at http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2016/2016-
108f.pdf  (Belg.).
27 Code Civile, art. 335(1)(2), 3d phrase, as replaced by Wet tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek met 
het oog op de invoering van de gelijkheid tussen mannen en vrouwen bij de wijze van naamsoverdracht 
aan het kind en aan de geadopteerde [Law Amending the Civil Code in view of  the Introduction of  the 
Equality Between Men and Women Regarding the Manner of  Transfer of  Surnames to the Child And to 
the Adopted Person], art. 2, May 8, 2014, B.S., May 26, 2014.
28 CC decision no. 2/2016, Jan. 14, 2016, available at http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2016/2016-
002f.pdf  (Belg.).
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basis of  their sex. Indeed, the disputed provision gave the father a veto right when 
deciding on the child’s surname. Therefore, the Court found a violation of  the principle 
of  equality (article 10 of  the Constitution) and annulled the disputed provision.
(b) Judgment No. 18/2016: filiation; right to challenge paternity; right to 
know one’s descent
In a controversial case involving the former King of  Belgium, the Constitutional Court 
confirmed, once more, with reference to the case law of  the ECtHR, that in legal pro-
ceedings to determine filiation, the universal right to know one’s descent must in prin-
ciple take precedence over the interests of  family peace and legal certainty of  family 
ties. Therefore, article 318 of  the Civil Code is incompatible with the right to respect 
for private life (article 22 of  the Constitution, read in conjunction with article 8 ECHR) 
insofar as it bars a challenge to paternity when the child has been treated as the child 
of  his legal father, a situation known as the “de facto status” (possession d’état), and 
insofar as it forbids a child over the age of  twenty-two to challenge the paternity of  his 
mother’s husband more than one year after the child discovered that the man is not 
his father. Any other ruling would prevent the courts from taking the interests of  all 
parties concerned into account. The lift of  this double bar permitted Delphine Boël to 
challenge the paternity of  her mother’s husband before the Court of  First Instance far 
beyond both limits and to bring a paternity suit against her supposed biological father, 
the former King of  Belgium.
(c) Judgment No. 72/2016: combat of  discrimination; sexism; clear definition; 
freedom of  expression
In 2014 Belgium was the first country in the world to introduce a criminal provi-
sion prohibiting sexism in the public space.29 The provision was challenged before 
the Constitutional Court for violating the principle of  legality in criminal matters, 
as it allegedly did not define in sufficiently clear and accurate terms the offence of  
“sexism.”30 It allegedly also violated the freedom of  expression (article 19 of  the 
Constitution). The Court held that, even assuming that the definition of  “sexism” is 
not sufficiently precise in scope or in content, the requirement that the criminalized 
acts and gestures must have resulted in a serious infringement of  the dignity of  the 
person, leaves the courts sufficient indications as to the scope of  the contested provi-
sion. Indeed, it is inherent to the criminal court’s mission to decide on the seriousness 
of  a particular behavior and to determine whether that behavior falls within the scope 
of  the criminal law.
29 Wet ter bestrijding van seksisme in de openbare ruimte en tot aanpassing van de wet van 10 mei 2007 ter 
bestrijding van discriminatie teneinde de daad van discriminatie te bestraffen [Law Combatting Sexism 
in the Public Space and Amending the Law of  10 May 2007 combatting Discrimination in order to 
Criminalize the Act of  Discrimination], arts. 2 and 3, May 22, 2014, B.S., May 24, 2014 [hereinafter 
Sexism Act].
30 CC decision no.  72/2016, May 25, 2016, http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2016/2016-072f.pdf  
(Belg.). See English version at http://www.const-court.be/public/e/2016/2016-072e.pdf.
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The Court further acknowledged that the contested Act interfered with a person’s 
right to freedom of  expression. However, as equality between men and women is one 
of  the fundamental values of  a democratic society, the Act serves a legitimate aim. 
Moreover, the necessity of  the Act in a democratic society does not depend on its 
 effectiveness, measured in terms of  its application by the courts and sentences passed. 
Indeed, the Act may also have an educational and preventive effect. Lastly, given the 
fact that the Act requires a special intent and a serious infringement of  the dignity of  
specific persons, it cannot be considered disproportionate. The Court therefore upheld 
the “Sexism Act.”
5. Conclusion
The success rate of  appeals before the Constitutional Court was quite high in 2016. 
From the Court’s foundation in 1985 until 2015, actions for annulment were suc-
cessful in 28 percent of  the cases in the sense that they resulted in a total or partial 
annulment.31 In 2016, the Court annulled the challenged provisions in 56 percent of  
the cases. Until 2015, preliminary rulings had an average success rate of  32 percent, 
while the rate was 36 percent in 2016. Last year, the Court ordered three suspensions 
(50 percent), which is considerably more than the 10 percent average from the past. 
The cases discussed in Section 4 show, of  course, only a partial picture of  the Court’s 
case law.
31 See Luc Lavrysen et  al., Developments in Belgian Constitutional Law: The Year 2015 in Review, 
ICONNeCt BlOg (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/10/developments-in-belgian- 
constitutional-law-the-year-2015-in-review.
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